UNITED	STATES	DIST	RICT	COURT
CENTRAL	DISTRIC	CT OF	CALI	FORNIA

HONORABLE ANDREW J. GUILFORD, JUDGE PRESIDING; COURTROOM 10D

CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT

United States of .	America,)		
	Plaintiff(s),))))		
VS.)) No.)	SACR	06-129-AG
Edward Showalter,)))		
	Defendant(s).))))		

REPORTER'S DAILY TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA WEDNESDAY, MARCH 30, 2011

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U.S. DISTRICT COURT REPORTER

APPEARANCES

033011 DCCD GUILFORD 10D SHOWALTER SACR 06-129-AG

IN BEHALF OF THE

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                SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA; WEDNESDAY, MARCH 30, 2011
    2
                   THE CLERK: SACR 06-129-AG: U.S.A. v
    3
         Edward Showalter.
    4
                   MR. STOLPER: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
14:35 5
                   Andrew Stolper on behalf of the government.
    6
                   MR. STEWARD: And, Your Honor, Dean Steward on
    7
         behalf of Mr. Showalter. He's present in custody.
    8
                   THE COURT: All right. Good afternoon to counsel
    9
         and good afternoon to you, Mr. Showalter.
14:35 10
                   Who would like to tell me what they would like to
   11
         accomplish today?
   12
                   MR. STEWARD: Your Honor, I'll start.
   13
                   THE COURT: Okay.
   14
                   MR. STEWARD: What we're ultimately requesting is
         that the court allow Mr. Showalter to withdraw his guilty
14:35 15
   16
         plea and set the matter for trial, and we would also be
   17
         requesting that the case go back to the wheel for random
   18
         reassignment here in the Southern division.
   19
                   That's what we're asking for.
14:36 20
                   THE COURT: All right. Now -- all right, go ahead
   21
         and tell me why.
   22
                   MR. STEWARD: Yes, Your Honor.
   23
                   I don't think the government can cogently argue
   24
         that they haven't breached the plea agreement.
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It's a fundamental portion of the agreement itself.

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The government recommended 16 months, higher than the low end, and I just don't think they have any argument that they did not breach.
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The government's response to date has been:
Mr. Showalter breached, so it's okay if we breached.

First, as we set out in our reply, we don't believe Mr. Showalter breached; but assuming for just a moment that he did, the government still cannot breach the plea agreement by unilaterally deciding that it has been breached.

There is case law, and we cited the *Guzman* case out of the Tenth Circuit at Page 3 of our reply and, more importantly, the terms of the plea agreement itself require at Paragraph 17, Page 8 that there be a judicial determination that a breach has occurred.

That didn't happen, obviously, when Mr. Showalter was originally sentenced and therefore the government is not relieved of their responsibilities in the absence of such a determination by the court.

I believe Mr. Stolper's comment in his papers was something to the effect of it would have been a wiser course to have run this by the court, but the clear language in the plea agreement says that the only time this plea agreement can be officially, if you will, breached, is when the court has made such a determination. And, as we know, that has not happened.

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In terms of the other portions of -- of -- of the
requests that we've made, Santobello is the basis for them,
for example, the need for a different court.
          The Santobello case talks about appearances and
talks about just fundamental justice and, again, I think each
and every one of the cases that discusses Santobello says
it's not the fault or in any way imputed to the court; it's
the government's breach that's the problem.
          THE COURT: That's okay. Don't worry about that.
          MR. STEWARD: Thank you, sir.
          THE COURT: Take your best shot. I welcome you to
do so.
          I'm glad you have obtained some clarification at
the Ninth Circuit that I'm prepared to respond to. Don't be
shy.
          MR. STEWARD: Well, Your Honor, frankly, for me
it's somewhat easy in that I wasn't a part of all of this, so
I can throw rocks at defense counsel, Mr. Stolper, quite
easily.
          THE COURT: Throw them at the court too is what I'm
inviting you to do.
          MR. STEWARD: Thirty-two years of doing this,
Your Honor, the words will not come out of my mouth.
          But, in any event, the bottom line is that the
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government's breach is clear. They have not given the court

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1
         any theory to support the fact that they didn't breach, and
    2
         so, in our view now, the key is the remedy. Our view is the
    3
         remedy is assignment to another court and the allowance of
    4
         the withdrawal of the guilty plea and Mr. Showalter would
14:40 5
         then request a jury trial.
                   THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Steward.
    6
    7
                   Mr. Stolper.
    8
                   MR. STOLPER: Thank you, Your Honor.
    9
                   The government's not going to go through and
14:40 10
         identify all the various ways the defendant breached the
   11
         agreement beforehand. Instead the government's going to
   12
         focus instead on the plain language of the plea agreement,
   13
         and that's Paragraph 16, which is different than the breach
   14
         part of the agreement. And I'll just direct the court to
14.40 15
         the -- there's different remedies associated with different
   16
         parts of the agreement.
   17
                   In Paragraph 16 it sets forth the US -- the
   18
         United States attorney's obligations and it prefaces
   19
         Paragraph 16 by saying "if Defendant fully complies with all
14:40 20
         of Defendant's obligations under this agreement, the USAO
   21
         agrees to do certain things.
   22
                   That means, Your Honor, that the USAO's obligations
   23
         in Paragraph 16 only arise if Defendant complies fully with
   24
         all of Defendant's obligations under this agreement."
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There is no requirement with respect to

14:41 25

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1
         Paragraph 16 that the government requests the court to
    2
         declare a breach or asks the court to declare a breach, and
    3
         the reason that is the case, Your Honor --
    4
                   THE COURT: What about Paragraph 17, Line 20?
14:41 5
                   MR. STOLPER: I'll come to that in a second,
    6
         Your Honor.
    7
                   THE COURT: -- Line 21.
    8
                   MR. STOLPER: And Paragraph 17 is the breach
    9
         language -- it's the breach provision, but there's different
14:41 10
         remedies under different things the Defendant can do under
   11
         the plea agreement the parties signed.
   12
                   Under Paragraph 16 all the government can do is not
   13
         recommend a low-end sentence. That's the only thing that
   14
         happens. Our obligation to recommend a low-end sentence, our
14.41 15
         obligation to abide by our sentencing stipulations and our
   16
         obligations to recommend departure or acceptance of
   17
         responsibility, those don't arise.
   18
                   The remedies under Paragraph 17, if there is a
   19
         judicially declared breach, are quite different. At that
14:41 20
         point in time, there is a whole set of things that can happen
   21
         to the defendant, including indicting him for additional
   22
         charges, tolling of statute of limitations, all types of
   23
         other remedies that are then triggered by a technical -- by a
   24
         breach of the agreement.
14:42 25
                   And so, Your Honor, coming back to the --
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1
         Paragraph 16, the only real question is did the defendant
    2
         fully comply with his obligations?
    3
                   THE COURT: All right. Okay.
                   You're firmly embracing the first line of
    4
14:42 5
         Paragraph 16.
                   MR. STOLPER: Yes.
    6
    7
                   THE COURT: I can see why you might.
    8
                   Was that an argument in your papers?
    9
                   MR. STOLPER: It was, Your Honor.
14:42 10
                   THE COURT: Show me where that -- show me where
   11
         you're embracing 16.
   12
                   MR. STOLPER: Certainly, Your Honor.
   13
                    (Pause in the proceedings.)
   14
                   MR. STOLPER: Page 5, argument, first letter A:
14.42 15
         "The government's obligation to recommend a low-end sentence
   16
         never arose."
   17
                   And then I wrote, Your Honor: "By the terms of
   18
         plea-agreement contract, the government's obligation to
   19
         recommend a low-end sentence arises only if, quote, the
14:43 20
         defendant complies fully with all of Defendant's obligations
   21
         under the agreement.
   22
                   THE COURT: And what line is that on, on Page 5?
   23
                   MR. STOLPER: Page 5, Line 22. It's our first
   24
         argument, Your Honor.
                   THE COURT: Well, I don't see you making -- it's
14:43 25
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1
         not significant, but I don't see you making this distinction,
    2
         this big distinction you're now making, between Paragraph 16
    3
         and Paragraph --
    4
                   MR. STOLPER: 17.
14:43 5
                   THE COURT: -- 17.
                   MR. STOLPER: I probably should have made it more
    6
    7
         crystal clear.
    8
                   THE COURT: Okay. I got it.
    9
                   MR. STOLPER: But there is a very meaningful
14:43 10
         distinction between those two things because of the remedies
   11
         that are triggered.
   12
                   But, Your Honor, there's another way -- but that's
   13
         the government's first position which is -- and I don't --
         contrary to what Defendant's arguing, I don't think there's
   14
14.43 15
         any legitimate dispute that the defendant breached the plea
   16
         agreement or didn't live up to his obligations in any number
   17
         of ways prior to any government sentencing recommendation,
   18
         and I can -- I won't go through them with the court but if
   19
         the court would like me to, I'm happy to.
14:44 20
                   That's the government's first position.
   21
                   The second position is, let's assume, for the sake
   22
         of argument, that the court is now asked to determine whether
   23
         or not a breach of the plea agreement took place, and it
   24
         would have to determine on both sides, did the defendant
14:44 25
         breach the plea agreement? Did the government breach the
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plea agreement?

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And it would also have to determine when did that breach take place? And the reason that's significant, Your Honor, is if the court were to determine that the breach took place prior — by the defendant, prior to the government's sentencing position, then not recommending a low-end sentence, then, as a matter of contractual interpretation, the government would have then been relieved of its obligations. And Mr. Steward is correct that it would have been error for the government to have gone ahead and breached the agreement without declaring a judicial — without asking the court, and the court so declaring a judicial breach, but as you play it through, Your Honor, as you play the song through to the end, the outcome is exactly the same.

If, in fact, the court determines that the defendant breached the agreement, then the government is, in fact, relieved of all of its obligations, and to the extent the government failed to obtain judicial -- the judicial declaration of a breach then and does so now, in the end the result is the same, which is the government is relieved of its obligations to recommend anything under this plea agreement, and if that type of breach were declared, the government would have the opportunity, if it wished, to bring additional charges and -- and -- and have additional remedies

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1
         as set forth in the breach portion of the plea agreement.
    2
                   THE COURT: So you have your "cake" of a guilty
    3
         plea and no trial, and "you're eating it too" without having
    4
         to recommend a low-end?
14:45 5
                   MR. STOLPER: That's correct, Your Honor, because
    6
         this was our -- our "cake" was not just a "no trial," our
    7
         "cake" was certain specific stipulations that the defendant
    8
         was going to follow.
    9
                   The plea agreement was not simply the defendant
14:45 10
         waives his right to trial, it was a set of -- the defendant
   11
         agreed to certain things under the agreement, including
   12
         certain punishment.
   13
                   He agreed that he committed certain amount of loss,
         he agreed that he -- that he -- you know, he agreed to a
   14
14:46 15
         certain number of victims. And the defendant, before the
   16
         government ever opened his mouth on any of these topics took
   17
         the position that there was no loss, that there were no
   18
         victims.
   19
                   THE COURT: Yes, but due to my ruling, you got
14:46 20
         virtually all the benefit of that, of those promises made by
   21
         the defendant, paying only the cost of some extra work in
   22
         responding to his later claim of not quilty.
   23
                   MR. STOLPER: Well, Your Honor, it's -- it's -- and
   24
         of course the appeal on all those questions, but I understand
14:46 25
         the court's point, which is --
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                   THE COURT: Well, wait. What were the conditions
    2
         in the plea agreement concerning waiver of appeal?
    3
                   MR. STOLPER: The defendant waived his right to
    4
         appeal.
14:46 5
                   THE COURT: Pardon?
    6
                   MR. STOLPER: The defendant did an appellate waiver
    7
         as well.
    8
                   THE COURT: But he did appeal?
    9
                   MR. STOLPER: Correct, Your Honor.
14:47 10
                   I don't want to get -- to get bogged down on this,
   11
         but the -- I quess the government's perspective on all of
   12
         this is what the government bargained for at the time the
   13
         defendant came in and pled quilty was certain sentencing
   14
         stipulations and certain other things. And the government,
14.47 15
         ordinarily, as the court knows, the parties come in and they
   16
         just say, these are our stipulations and this is where we
   17
         come out.
   18
                   THE COURT: Okay. Well, speaking of appeal, why
   19
         aren't the arguments made by Mr. Steward deemed "waived" on
14:47 20
         appeal?
   21
                   MR. STOLPER: Your Honor, I -- it's an interesting
   22
         question.
   23
                   They were not raised on appeal, but that said, we
   24
         are now back in district court, and I think the district
14:47 25
         court, again, is -- is facing a resentencing, and based upon
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that it's -- we couldn't find -- I couldn't find any law to suggest -- and I'm not saying I couldn't find it -- but I couldn't find any law to suggest that merely because he didn't raise it in his initial appeal he's not allowed to raise it when it's on remand back to the district court. I -- I do think it's an interesting commentary on the history of this case, Your Honor, that at the time we did the sentencing and at the time of the appeal no one legitimately thought that the government should be obliged to recommend a low-end sentence given that the defendant took the position that -- given that the defendant didn't follow any of his agreements under the plea agreement. I mean, I guess, going back to the court's earlier question, it -- it -- from the government's perspective it's fundamentally unfair that we're obliged to follow the sentencing stipulations in the plea agreement but the defendant can self-absolve. And the fact that it turned out that the government stipulations that we agreed to in the beginning were correct is of little comfort to the government because instead of it coming to this court as a joint recommendation, the government, as the court -- as the court well knows, had to fight tooth and nail on every part of this sentencing, and

this from a "fairness" perspective, the defendant got to have

that's -- you know, if you want -- if you want to consider

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         his cake and eat it too inasmuch as the defendant, you know,
    2
         was going to plead guilty and then did plead guilty, and then
    3
         the defendant got to back out of all of the sentencing
    4
         stipulations and put the government to its paces on all of
14:49 5
         those questions, and the fact that he ultimately lost on
    6
         those questions is fairly irrelevant from the perspective of
    7
         the fairness of this agreement.
    8
                   You know, these were sentencing -- sentencing
    9
         stipulations. The defendant absolutely violated them and I
14:49 10
         don't think it's fair for the defendant now to come into
   11
         court and say, even though I'm not obliged to follow the
   12
         sentencing agreements, you do.
   13
                   And from the government's perspective we think that
   14
         Paragraph 16 pretty much controls on this question.
14.49 15
                   Like I said, I don't think it's a legitimate
   16
         question that he didn't fully comply with his obligations
   17
         under the agreement; and if that's the case, our obligations
   18
         on sentencing just never arose.
   19
                   THE COURT: Disparity is something I should always
         be concerned about; correct?
14:49 20
   21
                   MR. STOLPER: Absolutely, Your Honor.
   22
                   THE COURT: And are you aware what this court did
   23
         in the case of Assistant Sheriff Jaramillo?
   24
                   MR. STOLPER: From what I read in the paper,
14:50 25
         Your Honor, which may not be the best account.
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1
                   THE COURT: Well, for the record, I'm thinking
    2
         about this case and issues of disparity. Go ahead.
    3
                   MR. STOLPER: In terms of sentencing or in terms of
    4
         what we're doing here today?
                   THE COURT: Sentencing.
14:50 5
    6
                   I believe there was a guilty plea and I believe one
    7
         of your colleagues decided that Mr. Jaramillo was not true to
    8
         his commitment and I believe your colleague did not make a
    9
         low-end recommendation.
14:50 10
                   MR. STOLPER: Yeah, Your Honor, I just --
   11
                   THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.
   12
                   MR. STOLPER: I'm sure you're correct, and I don't
   13
         feel comfortable speaking on that because I'm not privy to
   14
         all the facts and circumstances.
14.50 15
                   THE COURT: Okay.
   16
                   MR. STOLPER: And I don't know if my colleague
   17
         declared a breach or not in that particular case. But in
   18
         this case, under this plea agreement, and this is a matter of
   19
         contractual interpretation, our obligation -- the
14:50 20
         government's obligation to recommend low-end only arises if
   21
         the defendant fully complies. And unless the defendant --
   22
         and I think the record here is extremely -- is exceptionally
   23
         clear that he did not fully comply with his obligations,
   24
         didn't substantially comply with his obligations. In his own
14:51 25
         words he repudiated his obligations, and for the government
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1
         to now be required to recommend low-end, when the defendant
    2
         could basically walk away from the plea agreement is not
    3
         consistent with the language of the plea agreement, is not
    4
         fair and should not be the outcome.
14:51 5
                   THE COURT: All right. Anything further?
    6
                   MR. STOLPER: No, Your Honor.
    7
                   Thank you.
    8
                   THE COURT: All right. Any response, Mr. Steward?
    9
                   MR. STEWARD: Yes, Your Honor, if I may, briefly.
14:51 10
                   What I didn't hear there is Mr. Stolper's admission
   11
         that the government breached this plea agreement. I don't
   12
         think he can say other than that they did.
   13
                   His argument about Paragraph 16 and 17, I think, is
   14
         a little misleading and -- for contract reasons. I have to
14.51 15
         admit my contract training is rusty. I think I last had
   16
         anything to do with contracts in about 1974 in the first year
   17
         of law school.
   18
                   THE COURT: Well, of course, you've had something
   19
         to do with contracts every time you engage in a plea
14:52 20
         agreement, but not like contracts.
   21
                   MR. STEWARD: That's true, Your Honor.
   22
                   And more importantly, here, in reading the other
   23
         cases that cite Santobello, there's a lot of discussions
   24
         about these, and I think it's clear that a plea agreement,
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being a contract, has to be read as a whole, and what

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government counsel is trying to do is to parse this, which gives it a meaning that I don't believe is a fair reading of the entire agreement.

I believe that you have to read Paragraphs 16 and 17 together, along with all of the other paragraphs in the agreement in order to understand what the parties agreed to.

And Mr. Stolper's terms of Paragraph 16 utterly ignores Paragraph 17 and the judicial determination, because if it was the way that Mr. Stolper urges, then Paragraph 17 and its need for judicial determination would be a nullity, it would be something that would not be necessary at all, and I think it's clear from the meaning of this, clear as it's written, that 16 and 17 must be read together.

I do agree with Mr. Stolper about the potential waiver. I did not see any case that talked about that.

I think we're in sort of a unique factual posture and that may be the reason. But what we find now is that we have sentencing set at the end of next month and the operative document is still this plea agreement. So at this point, even if there was a waiver in the Ninth Circuit and a waiver of prior counsel, we've brought it up now and it's still an operating document, it's something that -- that's to be considered at the time of sentencing, unless the court allows us to withdraw from it.

THE COURT: That's a good argument.

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1
                   MR. STEWARD: Although I don't really think --
    2
                   THE COURT: Although you don't escape waiver by
    3
         changing lawyers.
    4
                   MR. STEWARD: No. I believe that's true,
14:54 5
         Your Honor, you do not.
    6
                   However, the keynote here is that once the Circuit
    7
         sent the case back down, as we approached sentencing, the
    8
         plea agreement is still in force and effect until the court
    9
         says otherwise, and so right now it's a document that we
14:54 10
         think is defective and we're asking the court to allow us to
   11
         withdraw from.
   12
                   And, Your Honor, beyond that, I would submit.
   13
         would particularly note, though, Santobello itself, which I
   14
         thought was a great -- a terrific Supreme Court case, and the
14.54 15
         Peglera, P-e-g-l-e-r-a, case, which is a 1994 case out of the
   16
         Fourth Circuit, I thought was remarkably close in facts to
   17
         our case, including the government's breach, there being they
   18
         didn't recommend the low end as they were supposed to, they
   19
         recommended a higher sentence than that.
14:55 20
                   THE COURT: All right. Anything further?
   21
                   MR. STOLPER: Your Honor, just one --
   22
                   THE COURT: Please.
   23
                   MR. STOLPER: -- point in response to what
   24
         Mr. Steward said.
14:55 25
                   As I understand Mr. Steward's argument, if this
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1 is -- whether it was waived or not, now that we're back in 2 district court, this is still the operative document. 3 If that's the case, Your Honor, then the 4 government -- if that's the theory under which the court's 14:55 5 going to proceed, then the government would respectfully 6 request that the court declare a breach of the defendant 7 based on his prior positions so it's no longer the operative 8 document. 9 As we stated before --14:55 10 THE COURT: You are declaring a breach; correct? 11 MR. STOLPER: We are declaring a breach and 12 requesting the court to so find, yes, Your Honor, based on 13 the information set forth in our papers. 14 THE COURT: Are you declaring a breach or 14.55 15 redeclaring a breach? 16 MR. STOLPER: We are -- we did not previously 17 declare a breach because we didn't believe it was necessary 18 under Paragraph 16. 19 And going back to Mr. Steward's point, the idea 14:56 20 that 16 and 17, if not read together, are a nullity is simply 21 not consistent with the terms of those two paragraphs. 22 Paragraph 16 says what the government can do if the defendant 23 doesn't comply and Paragraph 17 sets forth additional -- I 24 won't say Draconian, but additional remedies available to the 14:56 25 government if the court declares and finds a breach.

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                   And so I don't think that his -- his contractual
    2
         interpretation is correct. Those two paragraphs have -- are
    3
         distinct and they have distinct meanings and they trigger
    4
         distinct things the government can and can't do.
14:56 5
                   But in terms of -- in going back to the court's
         question about declaring a breach, we did not previously
    6
    7
         declare a breach, and I think that, as we requested in our
    8
         papers, that the court should so find a breach based upon the
    9
         defendant's previous statements in the prior sentencing
14:56 10
         proceeding and, I quess, the prior withdrawal proceeding.
   11
                   THE COURT: All right. Anything further?
   12
                   MR. STOLPER: Nothing further.
   13
                   THE COURT: Is the matter submitted by both sides?
   14
                   MR. STEWARD: Yes, Your Honor.
14.57 15
                   MR. STOLPER: Yes.
   16
                   THE COURT: Mr. Showalter, did you want to discuss
   17
         anything with Mr. Steward?
   18
                   (Discussion held off the record.)
   19
                   MR. STEWARD: Your Honor, one final point.
14:57 20
                   THE COURT: Sure.
   21
                   MR. STEWARD: The Guzman case out of the Tenth
   22
         Circuit is clear -- it's out of Circuit authority, but it's
   23
         clear that the US attorney's office cannot declare a breach
   24
         unilaterally. And it makes a lot of sense and I would ask
14:57 25
         the court to follow that as well.
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                   THE COURT: Okay. Is the matter submitted?
    2
                   MR. STEWARD: Yes, Your Honor.
    3
                   THE COURT: Submitted?
    4
                   MR. STOLPER: Yes.
14:57 5
                   THE COURT: Well, I did find that the defendant did
    6
         breach the plea agreement.
    7
                   I would have made that finding back at the time
    8
         prior to sentencing. I do think there is a breach. I think
    9
         applying contract law into this situation, as I am required
14:58 10
         to do, leads to the conclusion that there was a breach by the
   11
         defendant.
   12
                   For that reason and for the reasons we've heard
   13
         here presented today, I am going to deny the relief sought by
   14
         Mr. Steward.
14.58 15
                   I've also considered Mr. Steward's request that a
   16
         new judge be substituted for sentencing. I've considered the
   17
         various reasons why there might be such a request, and I'm
   18
         going to deny that request.
   19
                   I want to state a few thoughts here now as we
14:59 20
         approach the upcoming sentencing.
```

Mr. Showalter, I've thought a lot about your case since you brought your various motions for sentencing. I've thought a lot about your case and the sentencing hearing that occurred.

21

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14:59 25

I must say, I do recall there were lots of people

out there and they aren't there now.

15:01 25

15:00 20

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14:59 5

I do feel that I have to think about the victims; but, nevertheless, I've thought about the arguments you're making. I sometimes wonder if it is fair for us to hold you to a plea agreement and penalize you when you want to retract the plea agreement.

Later events that have occurred in this courthouse that caused me to think more about what happened to you -- I must say, though, that I remain convinced that I need to hold you to your guilty plea, and there is a couple of reasons for that.

One is that you made that guilty plea in my courtroom when you were under oath, and you admitted to the facts when you were under oath. And in that plea we call it a "plea colloquy." You were told by me, you know, you're under oath, and what you say is important.

And to my way of thinking when someone comes into my court and makes a statement under oath, I need to hold them to that statement. I take seriously statements made under oath.

Now, the reasons I made my ruling back then are set forth, I think, in a written order I did -- I believe I did a written order -- and that went up to the Ninth Circuit and we've got the written order, but I want to tell you some of my thinking on it.

15:02 25

15:02 20

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15:01 5

The prior opinion is in the written order and I'll stand by my written order; but there was a statement made under oath -- subsequently, I sent the sheriff of Orange County to jail for five and a half years for telling someone to make a false statement under oath. We had a president who was impeached for making a false statement under oath.

I take statements under oath seriously, and there was an admission of the factual basis by you under oath in a plea hearing which probably lasted at least half an hour and included numerous references to the fact that you were under oath.

So that's why I am sticking with the original guilty plea. But as we come up on sentencing, I will say I think I'm the best person to evaluate the sentencing, and I'll say, to reevaluate the sentencing in light of what the Ninth Circuit has said.

I always appreciate it -- and I mean that sincerely -- when the Ninth Circuit provides me with further quidance on how I can do the appropriate job of sentencing.

So I've read the Ninth Circuit opinion, of course, and I continue to think a lot about this case and I want to do what's right in terms of sentencing.

I do think I am ultimately, again, the best judge to do that, considering all the facts that have

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1
         happened in this case.
    2
                   So we have a date for sentencing; correct?
    3
                   MR. STOLPER: Yes, Your Honor.
    4
                   THE COURT: And what -- have counsel talked about
15:03 5
         evidentiary prove-up?
                    I know you have submitted substantial papers
    6
    7
         proving up what the Ninth Circuit found to be a shortcoming.
    8
                   Have you and counsel talked about how that wants to
    9
         be handled?
15:03 10
                   MR. STOLPER: We have not, Your Honor; but I'm sure
   11
         we will do so.
   12
                   We can actually do that now if the court would
   13
         like.
   14
                   THE COURT: There's the prospects of
         cross-examination.
15:03 15
   16
                   MR. STOLPER: Right.
   17
                   THE COURT: I'll leave it at that.
   18
                   There's the prospects of cross-examination.
   19
                   You don't have to discuss it now. You know, make
15:03 20
         sure, working with Ms. Bredahl, you set aside enough time.
   21
         This is obviously important.
   22
                   Again, I'm grateful to have the Ninth Circuit tell
   23
         me where I need to make further factual findings.
   24
                   And at the sentencing I will consider what evidence
15:03 25
         you present, Mr. Stolper, and I will reconsider the overall
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1 milieu of this case in determining a reasonable sentence. 2 Mr. Steward. 3 MR. STEWARD: Your Honor, if I may -- and this is 4 probably by way of giving the court a heads up in terms of 15:04 5 the timing of the sentencing. We're about a month off, four 6 weeks right now -- we have been having a lot of difficulty 7 getting cooperation from individuals who need to be giving us 8 some documentation, and the Reader's Digest version of what's 9 going on is we have a list from the government, the FBI 15:04 10 agent, who called each one of the victims and then there is a 11 number to the right of it. As I understand the FBI agent's 12 declaration, he called each one of those folks and said, did 13 you lose a hundred thousand dollars -- let's say, Mr. Smith -- a hundred thousand dollars? 14 Mr. Showalter and I believe -- and we have some 15:04 15 16 significant evidence already -- that those numbers are 17 incorrect, that many of the victims in this case recouped 18 money, both directly and indirectly, and the FBI's loss 19 amount for each one of them is simply the gross amount that 15:05 20 they gave to the bankruptcy trustee back in 2006 or '07. 21 THE COURT: It sounds to me you may want to have 22 the chance to cross-examine the FBI and put the entire bit of 23 evidence into doubt. That would put it into doubt with me. 24 MR. STEWARD: Yes, Your Honor; and it's actually 15:05 25 more significant than that in the sense that we believe the

1 victims received funds from at least three different sources. 2 First, is each one of the properties, as the court 3 will recall. Let's just say they had a dozen liens on them. 4 At some point that property was sold and somebody got the 15:05 5 funds off of that, and so we believe in that way, that 6 manner, some of these folks got money and it was not 7 disclosed. 8 Second, at least two of the properties ended up the 9 victims owning the property; they got the property, and we've 15:06 10 been diligently searching property records on all 19 pieces 11 to try and determine exactly what happened. 12 Third was litigation directly involved in this case 13 which had to do with the escrow company. The escrow company, 14 Gateway, and I think their subsidiary, Chapman Escrow, 15:06 15 conceded liability and paid out significant sums of money to, 16 perhaps, all of the investors, at least half of them for 17 sure. 18 We have subpensed the settlement documents for the 19 four lawsuits involving Gateway, and I know government 15:06 20 counsel's argument will be you can't deduct that off of loss. 21 But after the United States versus Crandall case, we would 22 argue that you can and would, and Mr. Stolper is well 23 familiar with that case because he and I litigated it. 24 Anyway, the bottom line is that we believe there

are many victims who recouped money that must be deducted

15:07 25

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         from these numbers, and that will affect the guideline range.
    2
                   Our plan, frankly, is to subpena probably four or
    3
         five of the investors who we know we can prove didn't -- did
    4
         not have the loss that they stated to the FBI; perhaps no
15:07 5
         fault of their own, they just weren't asked the right
    6
         question.
    7
                   And as the court knows --
    8
                   THE COURT: They were also probably angry, which
    9
         probably helps the position you're asserting.
15:07 10
                   MR. STEWARD: I have experienced a great deal of
   11
         that, Your Honor, in representing Mr. Showalter in a very
   12
         short period of time.
   13
                   Anyway --
   14
                   THE COURT: And that anger could lead to
15:07 15
         exaggeration or, let's just say, not giving the benefit of
         the doubt to Mr. Showalter.
   16
   17
                   MR. STEWARD: Yes, Your Honor; and my point of this
   18
         story is that we have diligently tried to pull documentation
   19
         that can prove our position, and we're having trouble getting
15:07 20
         it, frankly.
   21
                   The subpenas that we've issued are not -- are not
   22
         bearing fruit the way I think they should.
   23
                   THE COURT: Well, they have the power of the
   24
         United States District Court and I'll do what I need to do to
15:08 25
         enforce subpenas of this court.
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1
                   MR. STEWARD: Thank you, Your Honor. I appreciate
    2
         that.
    3
                   Perhaps I made the mistake of making the return on
    4
         the sentencing date, and maybe that's why things are slow,
15:08 5
         but I'm going to see if there aren't things I can do to speed
    6
         it up. And all of this is a prelude into saying that it may
    7
         be that April 28th is too soon for us despite all of our
    8
         diligent efforts to gather all of this material, because I
    9
         believe it will have a significant impact on the guideline
15:08 10
         range for Mr. Showalter, and as we've seen it's pretty
   11
         critical in this -- it's pretty critical in every case -- but
   12
         particularly critical in this one.
   13
                   THE COURT: So, Mr. Stolper, you just received a
   14
         Reader's Digest version of what the defense might do.
15:08 15
                   I wondered if they would be happy cross-examining
   16
         your FBI agent. There's some hearsay issues there. He now
   17
         apparently wants to call a random selection and put doubt.
   18
         So you've got that Reader's Digest version.
   19
                   The long and the short of it, though, is he's
15:09 20
         telling us the date may not be right.
   21
                   What's your position?
   22
                   MR. STOLPER: A few things, Your Honor.
   23
                   First of all, the question of loss has gone to the
   24
         Circuit and come back down. I don't believe that we're going
15:09 25
         to -- I don't believe it's proper to reopen that question.
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1
                   THE COURT: Well, wait.
    2
                   Didn't the Circuit say we need a better prove-up?
    3
                   MR. STOLPER: The Circuit said -- the Circuit
    4
         remanded on the question of victim count. The Circuit did
         not -- the Circuit found sufficient evidence on the loss.
15:09 5
    6
                   THE COURT: Okay. That's true.
    7
                   MR. STOLPER: I don't believe -- I don't believe
    8
         the loss question is in dispute.
    9
                   I don't believe it's -- the government has not
15:09 10
         endeavored to reprove loss because that question was fully
   11
         litigated.
   12
                   THE COURT: I'm sorry. I forgot that distinction.
   13
         They made the distinction between number and doubt.
   14
                   Mr. Steward, you would agree with that, wouldn't
15·10 15
         you?
   16
                   MR. STEWARD: I would agree that that's what they
   17
                  It was a general remand, not a specific remand, and
   18
         our position is everything's on the table right now.
   19
                   THE COURT: Okay. I'm glad you reminded me,
15:10 20
         Mr. Stolper, the distinction between the number of victims
   21
         and the amount of the loss.
   22
                   MR. STOLPER: And our position's going to be that's
   23
         the law of the case and it's not for -- to be revisited; it's
   24
         been fully and fairly litigated.
15:10 25
                   As to what the FBI agent --
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1
                   THE COURT: But let's stop there for a moment.
    2
                   MR. STOLPER: Sure.
    3
                   THE COURT: They said that whatever I relied on to
    4
         determine amount of loss was appropriate.
15:10 5
                   MR. STOLPER: (Nodded head.)
    6
                   THE COURT: At the sentencing hearing, the original
    7
         sentencing hearing, Mr. Steward -- or was it Mr. Ezekiel?
    8
                   MR. STOLPER: Mr. Cortez and Mr. Miller.
    9
                   THE COURT: Ezekiel Cortez.
15:10 10
                   Mr. Cortez could have said we're going to attack
   11
         those figures concerning amount of loss, and he could have
   12
         done it at the sentencing hearing.
   13
                   MR. STOLPER: They did.
   14
                   THE COURT: Well, it kind of goes to this issue of
15.11 15
         whether there has been a waiver or whatever.
   16
                   Mr. Steward is now saying that's wide open and he's
   17
         going to attack that.
   18
                   MR. STOLPER: And I -- I understand that's
   19
         Mr. Steward's position. The government position is
15:11 20
         Mr. Miller and Mr. Cortez fully litigated the question of
   21
         loss and then they didn't like the judge's -- Your Honor's
   22
         decision and appealed that question, and the Ninth Circuit
   23
         determined that this court's determination of loss to be
   24
         correct.
15:11 25
                   I don't think that's open for revisit, regardless
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1 of whether it's a limited remand or a general remand. 2 That's law of the case. That question's been fully 3 litigated and the Ninth Circuit has decided. 4 If Mr. Steward wants to reopen that guestion, I 15:11 5 suppose he could make -- if there's any procedural hook to do 6 it -- and I'm not saying that there is -- it would have to be 7 perhaps in the form of a motion to reconsider, but even that, 8 how can the Ninth Circuit reconsider its decision? 9 But, Your Honor, that's -- that's a legal question, 15:12 10 and I want to -- until just now I wasn't aware we were going 11 to be litigating loss, and so that's something that obviously 12 we'll have to research and brief, because I'm quite sure that 13 there's -- there's law on this question. 14 In terms of the date, the government's position, as 15.12 15 the court knows for a long time, has been this -- this case 16 was remanded, I believe, last summer, and we filed our 17 sentencing position -- I can't remember the date, but I 18 believe it was well over a month ago. 19 The victims in this case are not here today, 15:12 20 Your Honor, I think, largely because this hearing's been 21 shuffled around quite a bit, but I can represent that the FBI 22 gets called frequently from victims asking to know what the 23 status of this case is and when is Mr. Showalter going to be 24 resentenced?

I don't have to tell the court there's a lot of

15:12 25

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angry people out there as a result of Mr. Showalter's conduct, and to deny those -- those folks, I think, are entitled to some modicum of a speedy system, and I don't think it's going to prejudice Mr. Showalter in the slightest given that this case has been on remand for, I don't know, eight months, something like that.
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The final thing I'll just point out, Your Honor, is that some of the arguments Mr. Steward is making is simply not -- are going to make are simply -- the one that -- the one that I heard that caught my ear was this idea that -- that the escrow company paid out. They did. The escrow company was -- insurance company paid out because the victims had a pretty good argument that they should have detected Mr. Showalter's fraud and did not do so.

Whether it's insurance company money that pays out or whether it's victims who are out the money, the money is still gone as a result of Mr. Showalter's scheme to defraud, and the fact that an insurance company pays out for it is —is, under the law, including *US v. Crandall*, just is not an offset to fraud.

THE COURT: There is no collateral -- you're saying there is a version of the collateral source rule in criminal cases? That's a civil concept. We don't need to go there, but --

MR. STOLPER: You're talking over my head,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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for that loss --

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Your Honor; but the way loss works is, you know, if you steal something from someone and they're lucky enough to be insured
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THE COURT: Another way of saying that, which is said in the civil context, is that Mr. Showalter should not be the beneficiary of the fact that someone diligently paid insurance premiums over a certain amount of years?

MR. STOLPER: Correct; and I guess my cruder way of saying it --

THE COURT: I'm not sure those same policies would apply in a criminal case.

You cited a case, and maybe that takes care of it.

MR. STOLPER: It's US v. Crandall, and I am privy
to that case, but it doesn't take care of it.

Anyhow, I think the question before us today is: When are we going to go forward with sentencing?

The government's position is the defense has had more than adequate time to prepare. The issue as far as Government's concerned is a question of victim count. That's the only issue we briefed to Your Honor because that's the issue the Ninth Circuit said was infirm at the last sentencing.

On that question, I don't think additional time is necessary to prepare. Mr. Steward isn't arguing those folks that he called aren't victims; he's arguing that they may not

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         have experienced the amount of loss that was already fully
    2
         litigated and briefed with the Ninth Circuit.
    3
                    (Discussion held off the record.)
    4
                   THE COURT: Just for the record, that's a
15:15 5
         translator who is usually here when we have people who need
    6
         translations, and I wondered if she thought we had a hearing
    7
         at 3:00 or something needing a translation.
    8
                   Go ahead.
    9
                   MR. STOLPER: Just to finish up, Your Honor, the
15:15 10
         question before the court, I think, is victim count.
   11
                   I didn't hear anything in Mr. Steward's Reader's
   12
         Digest version that suggested that he had anything -- that
   13
         had a whole lot to say about victim count.
   14
                   If we're going to have another fully opened
15.16 15
         sentencing on stuff that's already been fully litigated and
   16
         briefed to the Ninth Circuit, then I suppose the government
   17
         will need more time -- more time as well because we'll have
   18
         to re-put on the entire sentencing again.
   19
                   THE COURT: Okay. Issue of victim count.
15:16 20
                   MR. STOLPER: Yes.
   21
                   THE COURT: What's your magic number?
   22
                   MR. STOLPER: More than 50.
   23
                   THE COURT: How many were here that day?
   24
                   MR. STOLPER: How many were here the day that the
15:16 25
         court --
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1
                   THE COURT: Sentenced.
    2
                   MR. STOLPER: Oh, I didn't bring that file,
    3
         Your Honor, but the answer is I don't know offhand. I think
    4
         it was approximately 50, but I don't know. I can't -- I
15:16 5
         don't want to represent that to the court, because I didn't
    6
         count.
    7
                   I can ask the FBI agent.
    8
                   THE COURT: Okay.
    9
                   MR. STOLPER: What I can tell the court is we've
15:16 10
         gone -- we've filed our position on this.
   11
                   I don't think this is a very complex factual
   12
         inquiry to determine who's a victim and who is not.
   13
                   The law on it's very clear. The folks who invested
   14
         money and didn't get some portion of it back are "victims"
15.16 15
         under the law.
   16
                   If that's what we're litigating, I don't think that
   17
         any time is necessary.
   18
                   The government set forth its position. Mr. Steward
   19
         has had ample time to review that position. Now it's time to
15:17 20
         resentence the defendant and move on.
   21
                   THE COURT: All right.
   22
                   Mr. Steward.
   23
                   MR. STEWARD: I just want to note a couple of
   24
         things, Your Honor.
15:17 25
                   First, I've only been on this case for about
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                  It was remanded from the Ninth Circuit last summer.
         60 days.
    2
         Mr. Showalter has asked me many times, "Why didn't I have a
    3
         lawyer before this?"
    4
                   There were problems with somebody CJA appointed
15:17 5
         before me, other than that, I don't know, but none of it was
    6
         his fault.
    7
                   And like I said, as for me, I've been on it 60 days
    8
         and I've put in a lot of time on a sentencing like this.
    9
                   THE COURT: Let me say, if you're arguing on the
15:17 10
         timing issue, don't bother. I will give you all the time you
   11
         need.
   12
                   Respectfully, Mr. Stolper, I made an error the
   13
         first time. I'm not going -- I'm going to do my best to
         avoid making an error this time, and if that requires
   14
15.17 15
         additional time, since the defendant is incarcerated, I'm --
   16
         I will accept reasonable requests for more time.
   17
                   So you don't need to address that, Mr. Steward.
   18
                   MR. STEWARD: Yes, Your Honor.
   19
                   THE COURT: I am wondering if we should avoid
15:18 20
         further work by you and further inconvenience and calling
   21
         victims probably is not a pleasant experience for the victims
   22
         or for you. Maybe we first need to preliminarily review this
   23
         issue by briefing.
   24
                   MR. STEWARD: I think that would be helpful,
15:18 25
         Your Honor.
```

THE COURT: So if you want to get together and work something out and request briefing and request a hearing on this issue so you will not be bringing folks into court only to have me state that amount is no longer an issue, perhaps you want to work that out with counsel.

Okay?

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MR. STEWARD: That's fine, Your Honor.

THE COURT: What else?

MR. STEWARD: The only other thing I was going to say, and it's more -- it's more properly addressed in the briefing the court's talking about, but we had cited at one point, US versus Pham. It's a Ninth Circuit case, 2008, at 545 F.3d 712, that talks about a remand in a sentencing where the sentencing is being redone. And the Pham case stands for the proposition that it's really resentencing de novo, as the court indicated, the court wants to do, but the issue is not specifically limited to that which caused the reversal and the remand.

And, again, it's the *Pham* case. We can -- I think it would make sense if we cited that, because it may save everybody a lot of work.

THE COURT: Well, I will say that the guidelines and 3553(a) kind of have a holistic approach, looking at the thing -- I think I used the word "milieu" earlier today -- so I'll be interested in what that case has to say.

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1
                   MR. STEWARD: All right.
    2
                   THE COURT: Just for the record, I've always --
    3
         I'll just throw this out here -- I had been puzzled by the
    4
         notion that you sentence a man to X, it goes up on appeal.
15:20 5
         The Ninth Circuit says you considered a factor you shouldn't
         have considered; do not consider the factor. It comes back
    6
    7
         and you sentence the man to the same X. I think that can be
    8
         done. But I've always wondered, does that mean you didn't
    9
         really consider the factor that you shouldn't have considered
15:20 10
         or whatever?
   11
                   Now, again, my understanding is I can be told that
   12
         doesn't -- that doesn't apply to enhancements based on
   13
         victims and amount, Mr. Steward. I'm not saying that.
   14
                   Let's just say "a factor."
15:20 15
                   I considered a factor. Not a mathematical figure
   16
         you're talking about, but I considered a factor, and it comes
   17
         back to me. And a linear logic would have to say the
   18
         sentence should be lower, but that's not the case. And I
   19
         think part of the reason is you do have to have a holistic
15:21 20
         approach on the matter.
   21
                   And so those are some of the thoughts I've
   22
         considered on the matter and maybe this case and others will
   23
         help me solidify that issue.
                   MR. STOLPER: Your Honor, I'm not sure it will
   24
15:21 25
         help, but both Mr. Steward and I -- I'm not sure when
```

1 Your Honor took the bench, but Mr. Steward and I were both 2 here before Booker and before there was the 3553(a) factors 3 with the same force, and I'll just comment that it's a -- it 4 really is a much more complex sentencing process than it used 15:21 5 to be. 6 Mr. Steward will, I think, back me up where it used 7 to be that if you tabulated the guidelines and the court will 8 pick a -- pick a -- in most cases, pick a range -- pick a 9 mid-point, low-end, or high-end, and that was really the 15:21 10 entire sentencing. And I think that in the post-Booker era, 11 judges are expected to exercise their discretion independent 12 of the quidelines, which makes these remands, I think, all 13 the more difficult to everyone. 14 THE COURT: I appreciate that insight, and you have 15.22 15 been at this -- both of you have been at this --16 MR. STOLPER: Too long, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: -- longer than I. So I welcome any 18 further elucidation you can give me. 19 And I've given you my inclination to provide 15:22 20 further time as needed. 21 I will also repeat, you know, my concern that 22 victims not be contacted unnecessarily, and I think that can 23 be avoided by preliminarily looking at this issue of 24 revisiting the amount after the Ninth Circuit approved of our 15:22 25 earlier decision.

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1
                   All right. So those are all thoughts. I think
    2
         counsel are going to have to talk to each other and see how
    3
         they want to set this up.
                   Is there anything further at this time?
    4
15:22 5
                   MR. STOLPER: No, Your Honor.
    6
                   Thank you.
    7
                   MR. STEWARD: No, Your Honor.
    8
                   THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Counsel.
    9
                   Mr. Showalter, we'll continue to work on this and
15:23 10
         try and get the answer right this time.
   11
                   Thank you.
   12
                    (End of proceedings.)
   13
   14
                                   Certificate
   15
                   I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and
   16
         correct transcript of the stenographically recorded
   17
         proceedings in the above matter.
   18
                   Fees charged for this transcript, less any circuit
   19
         fee reduction and/or deposit, are in conformance with the
   20
         regulations of the judicial conference of the United States.
   21
                                                          06/27/2011
         DENISE PADDOCK, CMRS, RMR, CRR, CSR 10199
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